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R
ecently, two American companies
came into conflict with the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The
first, Avon Products Inc., began an
internal investigation in 2008 regarding pos-
sible bribery payments, including travel and
entertainment expenses, to officials in China.
Now, Avon’s investigation is widening to
uncover possible payments to officials in
Argentina, Brazil, India, Japan, and Mexico
from 2004 to 2010. Avon is also perform-
ing compliance reviews in various markets.
It disclosed the investigation and is cooper-
ating with the SEC and the U.S. Department
of Justice (Ellen Byron, “Avon Bribe
Investigation Widens,” Wall Street Journal,
May 5, 2011, pp. B1–B2). The second com-
pany, Lindsey Manufacturing Co., was
recently convicted in a bribery case for vio-
lating the FCPA. Lindsey Manufacturing and
two of its executives used Mexican sales
agents to pay bribes to officials at the
Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE), a
Mexican state-owned utility from which
Lindsey Manufacturing sought business. This
conviction marks the “first time a company
has been convicted at a U.S. trial in a for-
eign bribery case” (Samuel Rubenfeld,
“Conviction in Foreign Bribery Case Is First
in U.S. Trial,” Wall Street Journal, May
11, 2011, p. B4). Prior to this, companies
either pleaded guilty or signed a deferred
prosecution agreement. 
These two cases point to the increased
attention to enforcement of the FCPA by the
Department of Justice and the SEC. Leaders
from both the accounting and legal profes-
sions suggest that some reasons for this
increased attention to FCPA enforcement are
intolerance of fraud and corruption, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), and
growth into remote areas of the world where
bribes are accepted business practices.
This article examines the court cases
filed by the Department of Justice against
individuals and corporations involving vio-
lations of the FCPA from 1998 through
2010. An analysis of these cases provides
useful information for the auditors of inter-
national clients as well as the management
of such organizations. 
A Historical Perspective
In the mid-1970s, the SEC performed
investigations that resulted in more than 400
American companies admitting to making
payments that were illegal, or possibly illegal,
to foreign government officials, politicians,
and political parties. These payments totaled
more than $300 million. The findings from
this investigation diminished public confidence
in the integrity of American corporations.
These investigations spurred the SEC to
pass the FCPA in 1977. It was enacted to
put an end to payments being made to bribe
foreign officials and to restore public confi-
dence in American businesses. The provisions
of the FCPA “make it unlawful for a U.S.
person, and certain foreign issuers of securi-
ties, to make a corrupt payment to a foreign
official for the purpose of obtaining or
retaining business for or with, or directing
business to, any person.” This antibribery pro-
vision applies to both privately held and
publicly traded companies. The FCPA also
requires companies whose securities are list-
ed in the United States to meet certain
accounting provisions, which require corpo-
rations covered by the antibribery provisions
“to make and keep books and records that
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions
of the corporation and to devise and main-
tain an adequate system of internal account-
ing controls” (www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf). In
1998, the FCPA was amended by the
International Antibribery and Fair Competition
Act. The 1998 amendments extended antib-
ribery provisions to also apply to foreign firms
and persons who participate in corrupt pay-
ments while in the United States. 
There are five elements to be met in
order for a violation of the FCPA to occur.
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First, the person making the payment can
be either a firm or an individual.
Individuals include officers, directors, and
employees. Issuers are corporations that
have issued securities that are registered in
the United States or corporations that need
to file reports with the SEC. Since the 1998
amendments, foreign companies and indi-
viduals can also be held liable under the
FCPA. U.S. parent corporations may be
held responsible for corrupt payments made
by their foreign subsidiaries. Second, the
action must involve  “corrupt intent”—that
is, the person making the payment must
have the corrupt intent to cause a foreign
official to act wrongfully in his position.
The third element requires that a payment
is made or that an offer or promise to pay
is made; this includes offering not only
money, but also anything else of value.
Fourth, the recipient must be a “foreign
official, a foreign political party or party
official, or any candidate for foreign
political office” in order to cause a viola-
tion of the FCPA. Lastly, there is a busi-
ness purpose test to determine whether
the payment was made to obtain or retain
business, which is prohibited. In such cases,
the resulting business does not necessari-
ly have to be with the foreign govern-
ment or government instrumentality
(www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/l
ay-persons-guide.pdf).
International Initiatives
There has also been increased attention
toward corrupt payments internationally.
Countries in North America, South America,
Europe, Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific
Rim have foreign anticorruption laws. The
United States, for example, ratified the
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (OECD
Convention) in 1998. The OECD Convention
provides elements that a foreign corrupt prac-
tices statute should include. Both Canada and
Mexico have implemented the OECD
Convention—in Canada through adoption of
the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials
Act (46-47 Elizabeth II Ch. 34) and in
Mexico through amendments to its Federal
Penal Code. Both of these laws set forth
penalties for bribing foreign officials. In South
America, Argentina is the only country with
foreign anticorruption laws, enacted under the
Statute on Ethics in the Exercise of Public
Office in 1999, which amended Argentina’s
Penal Code to criminalize bribery of foreign
officials. There are 23 countries in Europe
that have enacted anticorruption laws: Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Twenty of these countries amended their
existing laws or enacted new legislation in
order to implement the OECD Convention.
Lithuania did not implement the OECD
Convention; however, it participates on the
Council of Europe Criminal Convention on
Corruption and it adopted a new Criminal
Code in 2000. Lastly, there are countries in
Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Rim
that have FCPA initiatives. Japan, New
Zealand, and South Korea have implement-
ed the OECD Convention by amending or
enacting legislation to criminalize bribery of
foreign officials and to penalize those actions.
Australia also amended its Criminal Code
Act of 1995 by enacting the Criminal Code
Amendment (Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials) in 1999 to implement the
Convention (www.fcpaenforcement.
com/documents/documents.asp?PAGE=4). 
There have also been international agree-
ments put into place to enforce the FCPA,
including the U.N. Convention Against
Corruption, the African Union Convention
on Preventing and Combating Corruption,
the Organization of American States
(OAS) Convention, and the OECD
Convention; however, this is not an
exhaustive list of the international agreements
that exist (see www.fcpaenforcement
.com/documents/documents.asp?PAGE=4). 
The United Kingdom intensified its battle
against corruption with the passage of the
2010 U.K. Bribery Act. This act, which
became enforceable in July 2011, covers
activities of any person or third parties act-
ing on behalf of a business, such as
employees, agents, or subsidiaries. This leg-
islation is more extensive than the FCPA
because it pertains to all bribery, whether pub-
lic or private. The four offenses in the U.K.
Bribery Act include bribing a foreign public
official and the failure to prevent bribery. And
because the U.K. legislation is more exten-
sive than the FCPA, U.S. businesses need
to understand that compliance with the FCPAYear Number of Cases
1998 4
1999 2
2000 0
2001 6
2002 4
2003 5
2004 5
2005 6
2006 7
2007 19
2008 23
2009 34
2010 31
Total 146
EXHIBIT 1
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
Court Cases
Position of Perpetrator Number Involved
President or Officer 47
Vice President 20
Director 17
Manager 9
Employee 13
Corporation1 74
1 For companies whose securities are listed in the United States, no specific 
individual was charged; instead, the company itself was charged. 
The total exceeds 146 because some cases involved multiple individuals or corporations. 
EXHIBIT 2
Perpetrators
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won’t guarantee compliance with the U.K.
Bribery Act. 
Case Studies
The Department of Justice has criminal
and civil enforcement responsibilities for
activities related to the antibribery provisions
for domestic concerns and foreign 
companies, while the SEC has civil enforce-
ment responsibilities regarding the antib-
ribery provisions for issuers. This article
examines all Department of Justice FCPA
Enforcement Action cases from 1998
through 2010 (www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/cases/control-systems.html). Nine
major criteria were used to analyze the cases:
position of the person paying the bribe,
country of the foreign official that received
the bribe, bribe amount, type of transac-
tion, level of the conspirator, length of
imprisonment, imprisonment location,
amount of the fine, and amount of the spe-
cial assessment. The SEC has increased its
efforts in recent years to monitor compli-
ance with the FCPA. According to Lanny
Breuer, the head of the U.S. Department of
Justice Criminal Division, the FCPA allows
the United States to target the foreign bribery
problem. In addition, the FCPA discourages
corruption from occurring in the first place
(Dick Carozza, “The Aggressive Enforcers,”
Fraud, May/June 2011, pp. 36–40). 
Exhibit 1 shows the number of cases involv-
ing violations of the FCPA from 1998
through 2010. This number has significant-
ly increased in recent years; there were 39
cases from 1998 through 2006, compared
to 107 cases from 2007 through 2010. 
Antonia Chion, the Associate Director of
the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, stated
in a press release, “The SEC will not toler-
ate violations of the FCPA, regardless of the
lengths to which public companies will go
to structure their corrupt transactions to avoid
detection”(www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/20
09-23.htm). Companies should not be putting
greed before the law in order to gain busi-
ness, and the SEC is working to punish this
illegal conduct. Thus, the number of FCPA
cases and the penalties imposed has increased
dramatically, which will hopefully discour-
age future violations of the FCPA. The fol-
lowing discussion highlights each criterion
used when analyzing the cases.
Position of the perpetrator. There were
various positions of the perpetrators
involved in the FCPA cases—that is, the
Country Number of FCPA Cases Score
Netherlands 1 8.8
Germany 1 7.9
United Kingdom 4 7.6
France 1 6.8
United Arab Emirates 4 6.3
Spain 1 6.1
Taiwan 1 5.8
South Korea 1 5.4
Costa Rica 4 5.3
Hungary 2 4.7
Saudi Arabia 6 4.7
Czech Republic 1 4.6
Malaysia 3 4.4
Turkey 2 4.4
Latvia 1 4.3
Croatia 1 4.1
Ghana 1 4.1
Rwanda 3 4.0
Brazil 5 3.7
Montenegro 1 3.7
Romania 1 3.7
Panama 4 3.6
China 15 3.5
Greece 1 3.5
Serbia 1 3.5
Thailand 6 3.5
India 3 3.3
Liberia 1 3.3
Egypt 1 3.1
Mexico 6 3.1
Argentina 3 2.9
Kazakhstan 6 2.9
Senegal 3 2.9
Benin 2 2.8
Indonesia 4 2.8
Vietnam 2 2.7
Ecuador 3 2.5
Azerbaijan 7 2.4
Bangladesh 1 2.4
Honduras 3 2.4
Nigeria 25 2.4
Philippines 1 2.4
Haiti 5 2.2
Iran 1 2.2
Yemen 1 2.2
Kenya 2 2.1
Russia 3 2.1
Kyrgyzstan 2 2.0
Venezuela 3 2.0
Turkmenistan 2 1.6
Uzbekistan 1 1.6
Iraq 17 1.5
Total1 180
Scale: 0 = most corrupt to 10 = least corrupt
1Total portrayed here exceeds the total number of cases because a case sometimes
involved more than one country.
EXHIBIT 3
2010 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
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individuals involved ranged from high-
ranking officials to employees. They
included CEOs, directors, managers, and
employees. Although there were various
positions involved, the majority of the indi-
viduals worked in upper-level management.
Corporations were also charged with vio-
lating the FCPA. Exhibit 2 shows the
breakdown of the positions of corporations
and individuals involved in the cases. In
some of the cases, more than one individ-
ual was charged with violating the FCPA. 
Countries involved. In the 146 FCPA
cases that were examined, corrupt payments
occurred in 52 countries. Transparency
International—a nonpartisan organization
that was founded in 1993 to fight corruption
and has more than 90 national chapters or
chapters-in-formation throughout the
world—publishes the Corruption Perceptions
Index (CPI), which ranks countries by their
perceived levels of corruption. The CPI scale
ranges from 0 to 10; a score of 0 means a
country is highly corrupt, and a score of 10
indicates a country is very clean. The 2010
CPI ranked 178 countries. These results were
used to evaluate the countries involved in
the FCPA bribery schemes (www.
transparency.org/about_us). 
The countries involved in the FCPA cases
adhere to the expectations of the CPI results.
The majority of the countries whose officials
received bribes scored lower than 5 on the
CPI scale. There were nine countries involved,
however, that scored higher than 5. The
Netherlands was the highest ranking country
to receive a bribe payment, and it was only
involved in one such case; it ranked seventh,
with a score of 8.8. The remaining countries
involved all scored lower than 5 and were
perceived as being moderately to highly cor-
rupt. Officials in Nigeria, Iraq, and China
received bribes most frequently, cited in 25,
17, and 16 cases, respectively. Iraq appeared
to be the most corrupt country involved; it
ranked 175th out of 178 countries, with a
score of only 1.5. Nigeria ranked slightly high-
er, scoring 2.4, which put it in the 134th posi-
tion. China is actually ranked 78th but only
had a score of 3.5. Of the 178 countries that
the CPI ranked, fewer than 50 countries scored
in the top half of the index. Exhibit 3 shows
the CPI scores for all of the countries involved
in the FCPA cases (www.transparency.
org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/
results). Using the number of FCPA cases and
the CPI, Exhibit 4 lists the eight countries that
represent the greatest risk for 
management of companies and auditors of
companies that conduct business in these
countries. 
Bribe amount. Exhibit 5 displays the range
of bribe amounts for individuals and corpo-
rations. The largest bribe paid by individuals
was $300 million and this amount was con-
nected to multiple cases. Several individuals
and investors invested money knowing that it
would be used for corrupt payments. They
agreed to make payments and offers of pay-
ments to officials of the Republic of
Azerbaijan to induce them to assist several
corporations in acquiring a controlling inter-
est in the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan
Republic (SOCAR). The $300 million did not
come from just one individual.
Many of the bribes paid in excess of 
$1 million were paid by corporations or by
individuals who held a fairly high rank in
their companies. Individuals in these cases
were typically officers or directors, not just
employees. These findings are consistent
with the results of the Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) study
that examined the relationship between the
position of the perpetrator and the amount
of loss caused by fraud. The ACFE sur-
veyed a group of respondents and inquired
whether the perpetrator was an employee,
a manager, or an owner or executive. The
respondents were then asked to give infor-
mation about the perpetrators in fraud cases,
such as the amount of loss, age, job type,
gender, and education. The results of the
survey concluded that there was a strong
correlation between the perpetrator’s rank
within a company and the median loss. The
2010 study showed that the median loss
caused by an owner or executive was
$723,000, while the loss caused by an
employee was only $80,000 (ACFE,
“Report to the Nations on Occupational
Fraud and Abuse,” 2010, pp. 28–40). 
Type of transaction. The specific rea-
sons for the bribe payments in the FPCA
cases varied; however, the payments were
always made to obtain or retain some
type of business. Some corporations and
individuals were trying to win contracts
to sell their products or services. Others
were trying to receive preferential treat-
ment by circumventing foreign customs
regulations, receiving favorable tax assess-
ments, and avoiding customs or tariffs.
Two transactions—payments to Iraq
through the United Nations Oil for Food
Program and bribes to a minister of defense
in Africa—are particularly interesting.
The majority of the cases pertaining to
payments made to Iraqi government offi-
cials were made in connection with the Oil
for Food Program established by the
United Nations in 1995. The program
was designed to allow Iraq to sell its oil
in exchange for humanitarian goods, such
as food and medicine. Program guidelines
required the Iraqi government to use the
proceeds from oil sales only to purchase
humanitarian goods and services, which
had to be approved by the United Nations
(www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/index
.html). In 2000, companies that wanted to
sell humanitarian goods to the Iraqi gov-
ernment were required to pay a kickback
to the government in order to receive a
contract. The kickbacks were usually cov-
ered up by being called “after-sales service
fees.” These payments abused the pur-
pose of the Oil for Food Program and
violated the FCPA.
In 2009, there were 15 cases involving
22 individuals that were interrelated. The indi-
viduals were executives and employees of
military and law enforcement products
companies who agreed to pay a total of $3
million as a commission in order to win
part of a $15 million deal. They thought they
were paying bribes to the minister of defense
in an African country; however, there was
no actual minister of defense involved.
Instead, an undercover FBI agent was pos-
ing as a sales agent. This was the first time
that an undercover operation was used to
expose violations of the FCPA on such a
large scale and it represented the largest action
ever undertaken by the Department of Justice
against individuals for FCPA violations
(www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/January/
10-crm-048.html). 
Level of conspirator. In the majority of
the FCPA cases examined, the bribe recip-
ients were government officials of the coun-
try involved. There were also some cases
where bribes were paid to foreign customs
officials or employees of customs services
in order to receive preferential treatment in
customs clearance or avoidance of cus-
toms. Employees of foreign state-owned enti-
ties, who are considered “foreign officials”
under the FCPA, also received bribes in a
few of the cases. Lastly, in several cases
involving Nigeria, the conspirators were offi-
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individuals involved ranged from high-
ranking officials to employees. They
included CEOs, directors, managers, and
employees. Although there were various
positions involved, the majority of the indi-
viduals worked in upper-level management.
Corporations were also charged with vio-
lating the FCPA. Exhibit 2 shows the
breakdown of the positions of corporations
and individuals involved in the cases. In
some of the cases, more than one individ-
ual was charged with violating the FCPA. 
Countries involved. In the 146 FCPA
cases that were examined, corrupt payments
occurred in 52 countries. Transparency
International—a nonpartisan organization
that was founded in 1993 to fight corruption
and has more than 90 national chapters or
chapters-in-formation throughout the
world—publishes the Corruption Perceptions
Index (CPI), which ranks countries by their
perceived levels of corruption. The CPI scale
ranges from 0 to 10; a score of 0 means a
country is highly corrupt, and a score of 10
indicates a country is very clean. The 2010
CPI ranked 178 countries. These results were
used to evaluate the countries involved in
the FCPA bribery schemes (www.
transparency.org/about_us). 
The countries involved in the FCPA cases
adhere to the expectations of the CPI results.
The majority of the countries whose officials
received bribes scored lower than 5 on the
CPI scale. There were nine countries involved,
however, that scored higher than 5. The
Netherlands was the highest ranking country
to receive a bribe payment, and it was only
involved in one such case; it ranked seventh,
with a score of 8.8. The remaining countries
involved all scored lower than 5 and were
perceived as being moderately to highly cor-
rupt. Officials in Nigeria, Iraq, and China
received bribes most frequently, cited in 25,
17, and 16 cases, respectively. Iraq appeared
to be the most corrupt country involved; it
ranked 175th out of 178 countries, with a
score of only 1.5. Nigeria ranked slightly high-
er, scoring 2.4, which put it in the 134th posi-
tion. China is actually ranked 78th but only
had a score of 3.5. Of the 178 countries that
the CPI ranked, fewer than 50 countries scored
in the top half of the index. Exhibit 3 shows
the CPI scores for all of the countries involved
in the FCPA cases (www.transparency.
org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/
results). Using the number of FCPA cases and
the CPI, Exhibit 4 lists the eight countries that
represent the greatest risk for 
management of companies and auditors of
companies that conduct business in these
countries. 
Bribe amount. Exhibit 5 displays the range
of bribe amounts for individuals and corpo-
rations. The largest bribe paid by individu-
als was $300 million and this amount was
connected to multiple cases. Several indi-
viduals and investors invested money
knowing that it would be used for corrupt
payments. They agreed to make payments
and offers of payments to officials of the
Republic of Azerbaijan to induce them to
assist several corporations in acquiring a con-
trolling interest in the State Oil Company of
Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR). The $300
million did come from just one individual.
Many of the bribes paid in excess of 
$1 million were paid by corporations or by
individuals who held a fairly high rank in
their companies. Individuals in these cases
were typically officers or directors, not just
employees. These findings are consistent
with the results of the Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) study
that examined the relationship between the
position of the perpetrator and the amount
of loss caused by fraud. The ACFE sur-
veyed a group of respondents and inquired
whether the perpetrator was an employee,
a manager, or an owner or executive. The
respondents were then asked to give infor-
mation about the perpetrators in fraud cases,
such as the amount of loss, age, job type,
gender, and education. The results of the
survey concluded that there was a strong
correlation between the perpetrator’s rank
within a company and the median loss. The
2010 study showed that the median loss
caused by an owner or executive was
$723,000, while the loss caused by an
employee was only $80,000 (ACFE,
“Report to the Nations on Occupational
Fraud and Abuse,” 2010, pp. 28–40). 
Type of transaction. The specific rea-
sons for the bribe payments in the FPCA
cases varied; however, the payments were
always made to obtain or retain some
type of business. Some corporations and
individuals were trying to win contracts
to sell their products or services. Others
were trying to receive preferential treat-
ment by circumventing foreign customs
regulations, receiving favorable tax assess-
ments, and avoiding customs or tariffs.
Two transactions—payments to Iraq
through the United Nations Oil for Food
Program and bribes to a minister of defense
in Africa—are particularly interesting.
The majority of the cases pertaining to
payments made to Iraqi government offi-
cials were made in connection with the Oil
for Food Program established by the
United Nations in 1995. The program
was designed to allow Iraq to sell its oil
in exchange for humanitarian goods, such
as food and medicine. Program guidelines
required the Iraqi government to use the
proceeds from oil sales only to purchase
humanitarian goods and services, which
had to be approved by the United Nations
(www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/index
.html). In 2000, companies that wanted to
sell humanitarian goods to the Iraqi gov-
ernment were required to pay a kickback
to the government in order to receive a
contract. The kickbacks were usually cov-
ered up by being called “after-sales service
fees.” These payments abused the pur-
pose of the Oil for Food Program and
violated the FCPA.
In 2009, there were 15 cases involving
22 individuals that were interrelated. The indi-
viduals were executives and employees of
military and law enforcement products
companies who agreed to pay a total of $3
million as a commission in order to win
part of a $15 million deal. They thought they
were paying bribes to the minister of defense
in an African country; however, there was
no actual minister of defense involved.
Instead, an undercover FBI agent was pos-
ing as a sales agent. This was the first time
that an undercover operation was used to
expose violations of the FCPA on such a
large scale and it represented the largest action
ever undertaken by the Department of Justice
against individuals for FCPA violations
(www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/January/
10-crm-048.html). 
Level of conspirator. In the majority of
the FCPA cases examined, the bribe recip-
ients were government officials of the coun-
try involved. There were also some cases
where bribes were paid to foreign customs
officials or employees of customs services
in order to receive preferential treatment in
customs clearance or avoidance of cus-
toms. Employees of foreign state-owned enti-
ties, who are considered “foreign officials”
under the FCPA, also received bribes in a
few of the cases. Lastly, in several cases
involving Nigeria, the conspirators were offi-
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cials of the National Petroleum Investment
Management Services (NAPIMS). In these
cases, the defendants were trying to obtain
contracts for oil exploration in Nigeria.
Length of imprisonment. The maximum
term of imprisonment for violation of the
FCPA is five years. In cases where the defen-
dant received more than five years, she had
other counts charged against her as well. For
example, the defendant could have also con-
spired to commit money laundering. 
Exhibit 6 shows the ranges for length
of imprisonment. While terms ranged from
two months to 13 years, the majority of
those imprisoned spent 24 months or less
in jail. In addition to incarceration, defen-
dants usually received a period of super-
vised release following their imprisonment.
These periods normally lasted two or three
years. There were also individuals who did
not face jail time, but were placed on pro-
bation. In four cases, the punishment also
included community service, which ranged
from 200 to 300 hours. Some of the cases
examined did not provide a judgment doc-
ument for the defendant. 
Imprisonment: facility and location.
The judgment documents indicated that the
court could recommend the type of facili-
ty and location of incarceration. Individuals
were typically sentenced to minimum secu-
rity facilities. For example, in a 2005
case, a defendant was sentenced to a min-
imum security camp adjacent to FCI
Englewood in Colorado. In 2008, the court
recommended a minimum security satel-
lite work camp at Lompoc Federal
Correctional Complex in Lompoc,
California. There was only one case in
2002 that suggested incarceration in a
federal prison. In some of these cases, the
reason given for a specific location was
an attempt to keep the defendant near his
family. In cases where a location was not
suggested, the judgment document indi-
cated that the defendant should serve his
sentence at an institution designated by the
United States Bureau of Prisons. 
Fine amount. Both individuals and cor-
porations are subject to fines under FCPA.
Sanctions may be imposed for both criminal
and civil violations of the FCPA as follows:
 Criminal: Under FCPA antibribery pro-
visions, corporations, and other business-
es are subject to fines up to $2 million,
while officers, directors, employees, and
agents are subject to fines up to $100,000.
These fines could be higher under the
Alternative Fines Act.
 Civil: Under antibribery provisions, firms,
officers, directors, employees, or agents of
firms are subject to fines up to $10,000.
It should also be noted that actions that
violate the antibribery provisions of the
FCPA can result in private cause for the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization (RICO) Act, where sanctions
are for treble damages.
Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 8 show the fine
amounts for individuals and corporations,
respectively. While the highest fine assessed
for an individual was $1 million, the major-
ity of the fines were $50,000 and below. In
four cases, the defendant was ordered to pay
restitution, which ranged from $250,000 to
$3.5 million, instead of a fine. For corpo-
rations, the fines ranged from $1,000 to
$448.5 million, with half of the corporations
paying $5 million or less and half paying
more than $5 million. 
Country Number of FCPA Cases Score
Nigeria 25 2.4
Iraq 17 1.5
China 15 3.5
Azerbaijan 7 2.4
Kazakhstan 6 2.9
Mexico 6 3.1
Thailand 6 3.5
Saudi Arabia 6 4.7
EXHIBIT 4
Most Corrupt Countries, Based on FCPA Cases and CPI
Bribe Amount Number of Cases1
$ 0 to 500,000 43
$ 500,001 to 1,000,000 14
$ 1,000,001 to 5,000,000 35
$ 5,000,001 to 10,000,000 8
$ 10,000,001 or more 15
1 The number of cases doesn’t total 146 because in some instances, the 
documentation didn’t specify the amount of the bribe. There were 15 related 
cases (undercover investigation) with a total bribe of $3 million.
EXHIBIT 5
Range of Bribe Amounts
Number 
Jail Term of Cases1
1 month to 6 months 6
7 months to 12 months 5
13 months to 24 months 6
25 months to 36 months 3
37 months to 48 months 4
49 months to 60 months 2
60 months or more 3
1The number of cases doesn’t 
equal 146 because there are cases
where information regarding the
imprisonment term was not provided,
cases that were announced but 
not prosecuted, cases where the
defendant was placed on probation
rather than incarcerated, and cases
pending final sentencing.
EXHIBIT 6
Length of Imprisonment
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